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Abstract: This article responds to a preference for short-term history in research on
the infrastructure turn by engaging with the longue duree of East Africa’s latest infras-
tructure scramble. It traces the history of LAPSSET in Kenya and the Central Corridor in
Tanzania, revealing the coloniality of new and improved transport infrastructure along
both corridors. This exercise demonstrates how the spatial visions and territorial plans of
colonial administrators get built in to new infrastructure and materialise in ways that
serve the interests of global capital rather than peasant and indigenous peoples being
promised more modern, prosperous futures. The article concludes by suggesting that a
focus on the longue duree also reveals uneven patterns of mobility and immobility set
in motion during the colonial scramble for Africa and reinforced after independence.
These “colonial moorings” are signiﬁcant as they shape political reactions to new mega-
infrastructure projects today and constrain the emancipatory potential of infrastructure-
led development.
Keywords: infrastructure, infrastructure-led development, territorial design, coloniality,
LAPSSET, Central Corridor
Introduction
Within its “sphere of inﬂuence” the railway has made most things possible in East Africa
... Directly or indirectly, the railway has inﬂuenced all the controversies which have
arisen from the British occupation of East Africa. (M.F. Hill, Njoro, 25 February 1949)
Many of East Africa’s railway lines were constructed at the turn of the 19th cen-
tury, when European powers were embroiled in a “scramble for Africa”. The
desire for imperial dominance motivated colonial governments to commit scarce
resources to ambitious infrastructure projects, as they aimed to connect inaccessi-
ble parts of seized territories to key administrative centres and ports. Today, many
colonial railway lines are being replaced, modernised, and expanded. New invest-
ments in infrastructure are making possible routes and modes of connectivity that
were initially imagined and planned when East Africa was under German and
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British rule. This begs the question: If railways made possible the colonisation of
East Africa, as M.F. Hill suggests above, is it possible for the latest infrastructure
scramble in the region to have emancipatory potential?
In this article, we question the extent to which the newest wave of transport
infrastructure sweeping across East Africa is reproducing colonial legacies. We do
so by reﬂecting on the histories of two mega-infrastructure corridors currently
under development: the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET)
Corridor in Kenya and the Central Corridor in Tanzania. We ﬁnd that tracing and
understanding the histories of these two corridors reveals the coloniality of new
mega-infrastructure projects in East Africa.1 Speciﬁcally, we show how the spatial
visions and territorial plans of colonial administrators are reappearing in visions
and plans for these new mega-infrastructure corridors today. We argue that,
although the material infrastructure that comprises these corridors might be new,
the promises of enhanced connectivity and motivations behind connectivity are
anything but new. East Africa’s new mega-infrastructure projects carry ambitions
from the colonial past into the present under the guise of a modern, prosperous
future.
Our insights into the coloniality of East Africa’s new mega-infrastructure projects
also raise questions about what the region’s unfolding infrastructure scramble
means for indigenous peoples and peasants living along each corridor. A compar-
ative analysis of LAPSSET and the Central Corridor reveals how enduring legacies
of colonial planning and spatial visioning continue to shape how people experi-
ence and respond to infrastructure development. Moreover, varied political reac-
tions to mega-infrastructure projects in different contexts can be partly attributed
to different memories of empire-building during the colonial era and state-build-
ing after independence. In this sense, a focus on the longue duree reveals the con-
strained emancipatory potential of infrastructure and offers contextual insights
into the different reactions people have to new mega-infrastructure projects.
Our analysis is informed by documentation on infrastructure development in
Kenya and Tanzania. Archival research was carried out in the Kenyan National
Archives, which contain historical documents on transport infrastructure in pre-
colonial, colonial, and post-colonial East Africa. Recent documents on both coun-
tries’ infrastructure agendas were gathered through online searches and visits to
relevant government ofﬁces. Our analysis is further supported by four months of
ﬁeld research carried out with civil society researchers along LAPSSET and the
Central Corridor between July 2017 and August 2018. This ﬁeldwork involved
observational research as well as focus group discussions with 167 participants liv-
ing along each corridor. A further 43 semi-structured interviews were carried out
with key informants with responsibilities to people living along each corridor,
including representatives of civil society, non-governmental organisations, and
various levels of government. Media sources were also gathered and analysed to
further triangulate our ﬁndings.
This article begins with an overview of recent literature on infrastructure-led
development and territorial transformation in the global South. This section high-
lights the importance of focusing on the longue duree of infrastructure-led devel-
opment. In subsequent sections, we discuss the cases of LAPSSET and the Central
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Corridor—drawing attention to (dis)continuities between infrastructure develop-
ment in the colonial, post-independence, and contemporary era. Before conclud-
ing, we discuss how continuities between infrastructure projects of the past and
present shape people’s everyday experiences with infrastructure and translate into
different political reactions to new mega-infrastructure projects today.
The (Re)Turn to Infrastructure-Led Development
Investment in infrastructure has reached record levels across much of the global
South. As development banks and governments unveil ambitious plans for infras-
tructure development, investors have come to see these plans as lucrative invest-
ment opportunities. Nowhere is the “global infrastructure turn” (Dodson 2017)
more obvious than in Africa, where regional mega-infrastructure projects have
come to dominate national and global development policy agendas. Several new
multi-donor platforms, such as the Programme for Infrastructure Development in
Africa spearheaded by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, have been
established to promote opportunities for regional infrastructure investment. This
surge of interest in infrastructure investment reﬂects a growing consensus within
mainstream development circles that infrastructure is fundamental to achieving
development.
Infrastructure-led development aspires to address uneven development by (re)
spatialising and (re)designing territories through mega-infrastructure projects—
creating channels of connectivity that facilitate the circulation of goods, materials,
and information smoothly and evenly across space. While connectivity through
large-scale infrastructure investments can be realised in various ways, there is a
growing trend of directing investment towards infrastructure corridors. Corridors
are vast networks of roads, railways, pipelines, and ports, among other transport
infrastructure, built to connect sites of commodity production to urban centres
and global markets. These bundles of infrastructure produce transnationally net-
worked territories that speed up the circulation of commodities (Chua et al. 2018;
Kanai and Schindler 2019a).
Recent research on Africa’s latest “infrastructure scramble” (Kanai and Schind-
ler 2019a) attempts to explain the logic and timing of the continent’s infrastruc-
ture turn. Some explanations link growing demand for infrastructure to the rise
of a consumer middle class while others see the expansion of infrastructure as a
“ﬁx” for resolving spatial constraints that threaten conditions of capitalist pro-
duction (Dodson 2017). Others still attribute the rapid expansion of transport
infrastructure to the proliferation of national spatial planning initiatives (Schindler
et al. 2018). Governments across Africa are reinvigorating national development
plans that emphasise a need for spatial planning and balanced regional growth.
Simultaneously, development banks are promoting spatial planning as an anti-
dote to both market and state failure (Kanai and Schindler 2019a). From this
perspective, Africa’s infrastructure turn is linked to a growing number of national
development plans that identify spatial disparities as the problem hindering
development and balanced, well-connected spatial economies as the solution to
underdevelopment.
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One debate within this literature is if this trend represents a turn or return to
infrastructure-led development. There seems to be a growing consensus that Afri-
can states are returning to a previous “age of state-driven territorial design and
infrastructure enabled connectivity” rather than implementing an altogether new
approach to development (Schindler et al. 2018:346). Much like the 1970s and
1980s—when newly independent countries adopted national development strate-
gies that prioritised spatial planning and balanced regional growth—today’s
national development planning schemes emphasise the same priorities (Kanai and
Schindler 2019a:346; Kanai and Schindler 2019b).
In the following discussion, we contribute to this debate by tracing the spatial
visions and territorial logics embedded in East Africa’s current moment of infras-
tructure development further back in time. Recognising that there is an instinctive
preference to engage in short-term history (Braudel 2009), much is to be gained
by focusing on the longue duree of territorial transformation through infrastructure
development. As such, we use LAPSSET and the Central Corridor to illustrate how
the spatial visions and territorial logics of colonial administrators are reappearing
in the discourses, documents, and visions surrounding these corridors today. An
expanded historical lens also helps reveal how the reactions of people subjected
to new infrastructure projects are underpinned by collective memories of colonisa-
tion and state-building processes in the post-independence era.
National Development through Infrastructure in
Northern Kenya
Present-Day Infrastructure-Led Development
Kenya’s national development plan, called Vision 2030, aims to transform Kenya
into a “newly-industrialising, middle-income country” by the year 2030. Vision
2030 is being implemented through a series of successive ﬁve-year plans, each of
which identiﬁes and works towards the completion of ﬂagship projects. Kenya has
added new airports, railways, roads, ports, and power plants to its infrastructure
networks over the past decade as part of this vision. This infrastructure is said to
serve the broader goals of Kenya’s Vision 2030 in two ways. First, it is promised to
boost transnational connectivity and expand transnational trade and, second, it is
promised to address regional socio-economic imbalances by integrating discon-
nected parts of the country into the national economy and infrastructure systems.
LAPSSET (Figure 1) plays a central role in the achievement of Kenya’s national
development and spatial plans. Described by the Kenyan government as the “back-
bone for opening up Northern Kenya and integrating it into the national economy”
(GoK 2012:6), LAPSSET represents the “resurgent regional development regime” in
action (Schindler et al. 2018). Through this 2000 km long transport corridor, the
government aims to create a “seamless” and “connected” Africa (LCDA 2016). The
government intends to use LAPSSET to transform northern Kenya into a “nationally
and transnationally networked functional territory” that is accessible to global net-
works of production and trade (Kanai and Schindler 2019b).
LAPSSET is comprised of two interconnected components: A 500 meter wide
transport infrastructure corridor overlaid by a 50 kilometre wide economic
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corridor for industrial investment (LCDA 2016). The transport corridor includes
networks of highways, railway lines, oil pipelines, electrical power lines, and ﬁbre-
optic cables. From its coastal starting point, LAPSSET traverses nine counties
Figure 1: Map of LAPSSET and the Central Corridor in East Africa. Note: this map does
not show the East Africa Crude Oil Pipeline in Tanzania, which is planned to
follow the Central Corridor route from Uganda to Singida, where it will
diverge and proceed to the Port of Tanga north of Dar es Salaam
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across northern Kenya—all of which have been historically disconnected from the
rest of the country. The government claims that the transport corridor will correct
the region’s history of socio-economic marginalisation and also position northern
Kenya as a central logistics and transport hub.
In LAPSSET’s wider economic corridor, various development zones have been
planned, including resort cities, special economic zones, export processing zones,
and agricultural growth zones. The economic corridor serves two primary func-
tions. First, investment in the economic corridor is meant to facilitate movement
and logistics along the transport corridor. Plans for the economic corridor include
container storage centres, an oil reﬁnery, a shipbuilding and repair facility, and
multiple airports. It is anticipated that, once complete, these facilities will enable
the efﬁcient movement of commodities, capital, and people across northern
Kenya. Second, the economic corridor is meant to support the growth of existing
and establishment of new value added industries. Key economic zones have been
identiﬁed along the corridor based on the perceived potential of the arid, north-
ern landscape. Livestock production and processing, tourism, and urban develop-
ment are perceived as the most promising industries for investment (Interview,
Isiolo, July 2017).
To date, around 60,000 hectares have been earmarked for a livestock produc-
tion and processing zone in Isiolo County in north-central Kenya. Once complete,
this zone will include a large quarantine area for livestock and a modern abattoir
(LCDA 2017). There is also talk of developing a tanning industry in Isiolo County
(Interview, Isiolo, July 2017). The livestock production and processing zone will be
built according to international export market requirements set by Middle Eastern
countries, as the region has expressed interest in importing more livestock prod-
ucts from Kenya. Isiolo was identiﬁed as a rational location for this production
and processing zone, as livestock from South Sudan and Ethiopia already pass
through the county on their way to the Kenyan coast.
A second value added industry planned for the economic corridor in northern
Kenya is tourism. The economic corridor will eventually include three tourist zones,
each of which will host a “resort city”. These tourist zones will form a new tourism
circuit, where tour groups can make use of LAPSSET to experience three different
world-renowned sites in Kenya (LCDA 2017:7). It is anticipated that northern Ken-
ya’s “rich biodiversity” and “rare and endangered wildlife species” will attract tour-
ists to these strategically placed resort cities along the corridor (GoK 2013; LCDA
2017). Each of the resort cities will have close links with protected conservation
areas. For example, tourists visiting Isiolo Resort City will be encouraged to travel by
road to nearby national parks or reserves, such as Marsabit and Samburu, and pri-
vate or community conservancies, such as Lewa or Il Ng’wesi.
A further intended by-product of LAPSSET is urbanisation, particularly “in the
northern parts of the country which were hitherto least urbanised” (GoK
2015:111). The resort cities are expected to transform low density areas into tour-
ist towns with a “substantial population” (LCDA 2017). Some northern towns,
such as Isiolo, have been selected to form a special cluster of “gateway towns”,
which will serve as key transport hubs along LAPSSET. Other northern towns, such
as Moyale, have been selected as part of a cluster of “border towns”, which are
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predicted to grow with improved regional integration. The government promises
that these urban centres will provide commercial and employment opportunities
for rural populations, as well as “enhance regional security” and “stabilise security
in previously isolated unstable communities” (LCDA nd).
Ultimately, although a primary function of LAPSSET is to enhance transnational
trade and logistics, the corridor is also justiﬁed as a way to resolve existing dispari-
ties between northern Kenya and the rest of the country (GoK 2015). In this way,
Vision 2030 is often framed as a departure from Kenya’s earlier approaches to
national development and spatial planning. As Mosley and Watson (2016:453)
explain, Kenya’s northern “frontier regions were formerly seen as unproductive
and of little interest; now they are seen as the site of unexploited resources that
could provide the engine of growth for the wider national economy”. Flagship
projects like LAPSSET are being used to incorporate northern Kenya “fully into the
state as never before” (Mosley and Watson 2016:453). Such ideas are embodied
by the general public: It is common to hear people in the region make comments
like, “Because of LAPPSET, Isiolo is now becoming the most important town in
the country” (Interview, Isiolo, July 2017), or “Through LAPSSET, we are becom-
ing part of Kenya for the ﬁrst time” (Interview, Isiolo, July 2018).
Colonial Era Infrastructure-Led Development
Historicising LAPSSET reveals that the imperative of enhancing transnational con-
nectivity throughout northern Kenya while securing its “underexploited” eco-
nomic potential is reminiscent of colonial logics and modes of planning. LAPSSET
runs through what was known as the Northern Frontier District (NFD) under the
East African Protectorate (or “British East Africa”). The East African Protectorate
established the NFD in 1909 with administrative posts at Meru, Marsabit, Fort
Harrington (Moyale), and, later, Archer’s Post. At the time, the British presence in
the NFD aimed to protect Kenya’s borders with Abyssinia (now Ethiopia) and
Somalia (Oba 2013; Waweru 2001). This was achieved by restricting movement
into and within the NFD. The NFD was “conceived primarily as a buffer zone
between the fertile white highlands of Kenya, and the rival imperial powers of
Ethiopia and Italy to the north and east” (Whittaker 2017:386). During the years
immediately after the NFD was established, expenditures in the district beyond
“law and order” were seen as an unnecessary drain on the empire’s budget.
However, the colonial administration’s ideas about how best to impose and
maintain order in the NFD evolved over time. In 1911, the colonial administration
decided to “consolidate” rule over the NFD (Oba 2013). In the annual report on
the East Africa Protectorate for the year 1911–1912, the Governor states:
... it has been decided to adopt a more vigorous policy in the administration of the
tribes inhabiting the Northern Frontier District and Jubaland. Hitherto the Government
stations have been posts of observation only ... It is now felt, however, that in order
to ensure the proper advancement of these scattered tribes the Government must
openly assume the administration of their territories. (East Africa Protectorate
1912:55)
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This “more vigorous” administration policy involved appointing and stationing
additional police forces to administer so-called “scattered tribes” across northern
Kenya—“to travel among them, to assist them in their desire to trade, and gener-
ally to gain their conﬁdence” (East Africa Protectorate 1912:55). A force of armed,
mounted guards was also established to assertively preserve peace across the
NFD.
New security measures were accompanied by an interest in better integrating
the NFD into the East Africa Protectorate for both economic and political pur-
poses. The colonial administration proposed that a more efﬁcient form of trans-
port was needed between key centres linking Abyssinia and Kenya, including
Meru, Marsabit, and Moyale. According to the Governor:
It is hoped to construct a road from Meru to Marsabit suitable for wheeled transport,
which will greatly facilitate communications. It is also proposed to open trade routes
between Kismayu, Afmadu, Wajheir, and Moyale; between Moyale, Eil Wak, and Ser-
enli; and possibly between Wajheir and Meru; while the route between Moyale, Mar-
sabit, and Nairobi is already proving of great advantage to Abyssinian traders. (East
Africa Protectorate 1912:55)
The importance of improving transport infrastructure in the NFD, including
developing transnational linkages, was reiterated in subsequent annual reports.
The Governor and the NFD administrative ofﬁcials also debated how to go about
securing funds for this task in personal correspondence. By the 1950s, during dis-
cussions about a railway extension towards central Kenya, it was even proposed
that the railway be extended all the way to Ethiopia for strategic purposes.
At other points in time, references to improving transport infrastructure in the
NFD were linked to the domestic and cross-border livestock trade. Geoffrey Archer,
a colonial administrator posted in the NFD, was supportive of opening up livestock
trade routes between southern Abyssinia and Nairobi. In 1913, Archer reported that
7000 head of cattle had been sent from Ethiopia to Nairobi via Moyale that year.
This led the Governor to state that “the establishment of a cattle trade with Abyssi-
nia has developed in a remarkable manner, and there is every prospect that it will
continue to grow” (East Africa Protectorate 1913:59). However, because the NFD
was viewed as a source of cattle disease by white ranchers, the region was regularly
placed under quarantine. As a result, the colonial administration ultimately spent
more time enforcing livestock quarantine in the NFD than facilitating trade.
A secondary motivation for improving transport infrastructure across the NFD
was to grow the region’s hunting and tourism sectors. It was initially hoped that
improving the road between Nairobi and Marsabit would attract European and
North American hunters to Marsabit’s designated game reserve, then called the
“Northern Game Reserve”, and so generate revenue to support the administration
of the northern districts. As outlined in the annual report on the East Africa Pro-
tectorate for the year 1910–1911:
A great deal of the Northern Game Reserve is extremely arid waterless country, form-
ing a natural stronghold for species which are adapted to such conditions, but not a
sanctuary for a large variety. Elephants are numerous, and so are rhinoceroses, and a
number of Greater Kudu are reported ... As transport improves this shooting ground
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will very much increase in value as there is a large variety of game. (East Africa Protec-
torate 1911:57)
Administrative correspondence during the early 1900s boasted about the abun-
dance of wildlife in the NFD, even describing the growing black rhinoceros popu-
lation as a “nuisance” (East Africa Protectorate 1911). As big game hunting grew
more contentious, the Northern Game Reserve on Mount Marsabit was promoted
for photographic instead of hunting safaris. Processes of removing and excluding
pastoralists from the mountain began and, over the following decades, more and
more restrictions were placed on natural resource use on Mount Marsabit. In
1948, the Northern Game Reserve was proclaimed Kenya’s ﬁrst national park and
signiﬁcant efforts were undertaken to attract tourists to the freshly minted “Mar-
sabit National Park”, including the construction of new tourist lodging facilities
(Matheka 2005). Yet, like efforts to grow the livestock trade, attempts to attract
tourists to the NFD were mostly unsuccessful (see Matheka 2005).
As the livestock and tourism sectors grew slowly, small urban centres emerged
along key northern trade routes. Measures were taken to encourage the sedentari-
sation of pastoralists along these routes. Additionally, the colonial administration
offered incentives for traders of Arab or Indian descent to settle key centres across
the NFD, hoping this would stimulate demand for consumer goods and direct
northern populations to wage labour (Waweru 2001). As one administrator
argued, “shops and traders should be encouraged. They are more civilising in
their effect on natives than the mere marching of platoons of soldiery about the
District” (O/C, Samburu District to CO, 5th KAR, 1 November 1921, KNA/DC/
SAM/1/1). Many of these nascent urban centres grew in importance during
forced villagisation processes after Kenya’s independence and have since been
redesignated as strategic growth nodes through Vision 2030.
Bridging Eras of Infrastructure-Led Development in Northern
Kenya
In the years immediately after Kenya’s independence in 1963, efforts to maintain
order in the NFD were challenged as a Somali secessionist movement gained
momentum. Many across the north fought for the right to unify with Somalia
rather than Kenya, leading to the Shifta War in the 1960s. Kenya’s newly inde-
pendent government sought to gain control of the region by increasing its secu-
rity presence and restricting movement: Between 50% and 80% of the total
population of the NFD was settled in strategic villages, enclosed by barbed wire
and thorn-bush fences (Dahl 1979:202; Whittaker 2012). At the same time, the
government effectively starved northern Kenya of resources in favour of develop-
ing so-called high-potential agricultural areas under its new development policy,
Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 on African Socialism and its Application to Planning
in Kenya (Odhiambo 2013). Combined, these measures had lasting “ ... implica-
tions for the operation of the pastoral economy ... and initiated a process of
long-term sedentarisation due to impoverishment and livestock loss” (Whittaker
2012:357).
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Between independence and the turn of the 21st century, minor investments
were made in infrastructure in northern Kenya. Certain roads were upgraded from
sand to murram or murram to tarmac in “the maintenance of law and order”
(RoK 1968) and to “win the loyalty of inhabitants” (RoK 1972:8). The govern-
ment also made minor investments in gateway towns as part of its evolving urban
policy (see Evans 1989). Gateway towns were seen as important links between
northern areas of the country and better developed markets elsewhere (RoK
1969:50). The government also believed that facilitating trade through these cen-
tres and along key trading routes would serve as an “economic/physiological
weapon” against a renewed shifta campaign (RoK 1972:8). However, investment
in the north remained limited and delegated to under-resourced district authori-
ties. The government body tasked with managing the development of the north
during this period was called the “Ministry of Reclamation and Development of
Arid, Semi-Arid Areas and Wastelands” (emphasis added), reﬂecting the space the
north occupied in Kenya’s national imaginary.
The idea of wastelands features prominently in historical writing on northern
Kenya. Like the post-independence government, the East African Protectorate is
often seen to have treated the NFD as a “wasteland”—a buffer zone between the
productive, white-settled highlands of central Kenya and “hostile” neighbours to
the north and east. Yet, the evidence presented above suggests that certain colo-
nial administrators saw potential in the NFD. They envisioned fostering national
development through this region by attracting tourists, growing the livestock
trade, and settling urban centres. Nevertheless, their ambitions were thwarted by
poor connectivity, livestock disease, and insecurity and government intervention
in northern Kenya slowed in the independence era. Today, there is a resurgence
of interest in “unlocking” the potential of Kenya’s arid and semi-arid lands
through Vision 2030 and its ﬂagship project, LAPSSET (GoK 2017). Although the
infrastructure being developed to unlock this potential might appear modern and
new, the pathways through which national development is being pursued mirror
colonial ambitions and logics.
National Development through Infrastructure in
Central Tanzania
Present-Day Infrastructure-Led Development
Much like Kenya’s Vision 2030, Tanzania’s Development Vision 2025 outlines the
government’s strategy for transforming Tanzania into a strong and competitive
middle-income country by 2025. Vision 2025 is also being implemented through
a series of successive ﬁve-year plans. The current plan, entitled Nurturing Industrial-
isation for Economic Transformation and Human Development, emphasises the cre-
ation of policy and regulatory frameworks conducive to trade-induced
industrialisation. It also pinpoints key ﬂagship infrastructure projects to drive
industrialisation.
The Central Corridor (Figure 1) is key to achieving Tanzania’s Development
Vision 2025. Once complete, the corridor will support the establishment and
growth of several different industries. The Central Corridor also links the
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landlocked countries of Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC)—along with Tanzania’s hinterlands—to the Port of Dar es Salaam
on the Indian Ocean. It is a multi-modal transport route, consisting of ﬁve com-
ponents: port facilities, inland waterways, roads, railways, and one-stop border
crossings. The Government of Tanzania conﬁdently states that the Central Corri-
dor is the “obvious aorta of [the] East African economic zone and crucial for inte-
gration of the region” (RoT 2011)—placing the corridor in competition with
LAPSSET in Kenya to become the leading logistics and transport hub in the
region.
The Central Corridor was established in 2006, but progress was stalled by a lack
of investment. Recent investment in the Central Corridor is attributable to two
key developments. First, new mining investments in the Great Lakes region have
created demand for more efﬁcient transport infrastructure for the export of bulk
commodities. Second, the Central Corridor was boosted when Uganda decided
to export crude oil through Tanzania rather than Kenya. Initial plans for the East
African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) suggest that it will follow the Central Corridor
route through Uganda and across Tanzania. With a US $3.5 billion investment in
the EACOP, portions of the Central Corridor that were previously seen as low pri-
ority or not economically viable have been prioritised.
A key objective of the Central Corridor is to expand Tanzania’s participation
and leadership role in global value chains and production networks. The Central
Corridor aims to enable Tanzania and Great Lakes countries to “unlock” the
potential of underexploited energy and mineral resources. Although Tanzania
intends to strengthen its role in oil and gas value chains by building pipeline
infrastructure along the Central Corridor, the corridor has also been presented as
a means of growing other industries, such as agriculture, ﬁshing, and tourism. If
extractive, agricultural, ﬁshing, and tourism investments along the corridor unfold
as planned, transit demand through the Port of Dar es Salaam is projected to
grow from ﬁve million to 14.87 million tons between 2015 and 2030—translating
into billions of dollars of government revenue (World Bank 2017). The govern-
ment argues that reducing transit costs in central Tanzania will make the region a
more desirable place to invest in industries of all sorts. This is promised to have
trickle-down effects that spur further economic development and yield desirable
human development outcomes along the corridor (RoT 2016).
Smallholder farming and husbandry are the dominant livelihoods along the
Central Corridor, and parts of the corridor pass through areas with relatively high
levels of poverty. The Tanzanian government’s plan for addressing poverty is pre-
mised on the belief that “industrial transformation goes hand in hand with efforts
to create decent employment, reduce income poverty and improve human well-
being” (RoT 2016:18). The government is directing agricultural investments along
the Central Corridor towards six key commodities: beef, poultry, rice, grapes,
maize, and sunﬂowers (RoT 2011). Attracting investment to intensify the produc-
tion of these commodities is promised to create new opportunities for contract
farming, wage labour, and local/small businesses. In addition to creating new
employment and business opportunities, it is said that new investments will drive
rural industrialisation and foster productivity gains, as new technologies and
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energy infrastructure become available in previously disconnected parts of Tanza-
nia (RoT 2011).
Through the Central Corridor, Tanzania seeks to “kick start a dynamic process
of agriculture-led and resource-based industrialization” in pursuit of an “export-
led growth strategy” that exploits the country’s geography (RoT 2011). As part of
this strategy, the government aims to ensure that its territory is organised around
export-oriented production and trade. Because this reﬂects earlier approaches to
spatial planning and development, the government does not have to start anew
in its territorial design. Rather, historical ideas about how best to organise its terri-
tory and the surrounding region are simply being updated and existing infrastruc-
ture rehabilitated along many parts of the corridor.
Colonial Era Infrastructure-Led Development
The Central Corridor maps almost perfectly onto the Central Caravan route,
which supported East African and Zanzibari trade during the 1800s. The explosive
growth in demand for ivory in Europe, India, and North America during the 19th
century—coupled with demand for slaves—drove Arabic and Indian traders to
Africa’s Great Lakes region. By some estimates, up to 100,000 people travelled
along the Central Caravan each year by the time of German colonisation during
the 1880s (Iliffe 1979). Thus, central Tanzania has a long history of facilitating
ﬂows of commodities and people in and out of the region.
German rule in Tanzania owed much to a chartered company, called Deutsche-
Ostafrikanische Geselleschaft (DOAG). In working to gain control over exports in
the region, such as ivory and rubber, the DOAG made use of the existing Central
Caravan route while the slave trade continued initially unabated alongside its trad-
ing activities (Mapunda 2017). In addition to trade, the DOAG saw economic
potential in growing the region’s cash crop economy. It established plantations
during the late 1800s and plantation agriculture spread quickly across the most
fertile and accessible regions of the colony (Maddox 1998). By the time the
DOAG was sold to the German government at the turn of the 19th century, Tan-
zania’s economy was neatly organised around the export of a few key agricultural
commodities.
The German approach was to exploit agricultural potential unique to different
parts of Tanzania, encouraging the development of plantations best suited to the
climate and ecology of particular regions. Coffee plantations were established in
the mountain regions of northeastern Tanzania; sisal and rubber production
expanded as new plantations were established in central Tanzania; and new vari-
eties of cotton and tobacco were introduced through smallholder schemes across
western Tanzania to increase the productivity of these crops (Iliffe 1979). Accord-
ing to Maddox (1998), the Germans organised the colony by creating distinct
export-producing regions, which tended to be better integrated into the global
economy than they were with each other.
As the production of agricultural commodities expanded, caravan and water
transport quickly became insufﬁcient for moving the mass quantity of agricultural
goods being produced and the inputs needed for their production (Maddox
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1998). Construction of a railway line from the coast towards plantation areas in
the north was slowly progressing, but agricultural exports from the Great Lakes
region were still carried by porters. It was not until the Maji Maji Rebellion—an
armed rebellion against German rule that started around 1905—that construction
on a central railway line towards the Great Lakes region began. This line served
multiple purposes:
... by the completion ... of the railway from the coast at Dar-es-Salaam to Lake Tan-
ganyika an important advance was made, not only in the project to capture the trade
of Central Africa, but towards the economic development of the colony itself. This rail-
way has proved very useful in the military operations, as it vastly facilitates the trans-
port of troops to and from the western frontier of the colony. (Cana 1916:298)
Construction on the Central Line began in 1905 and was completed by 1914.
The railway line followed the Central Caravan from Dar es Salaam through central
Tanzania to Kigoma on the eastern shores of Lake Tanganyika. Importantly, this
railway line contributed to reorganising territory within the colony, as “Tanga and
Dar es Salaam became the major economic centers of the colony, replacing Bag-
amoyo, Kilwa, and Pangani, which had handled the bulk of the territory’s
exports” (Maddox 1998:450).
Once the Central Line was operational, it solidiﬁed the Germans’ approach to
regional development and planning, in which different parts of the country spe-
cialised in producing different commodities for export. As Iliffe (1979:314) writes:
Each region along the central railway supplied its speciality. Kigoma sent dagaa, the
sun-dried whitebait from Lake Tanganyika which had reached the coast since the
nineteenth century. Uvinza supplied salt, Tabora produced groundnuts, Ugogo sent
cattle, Usagara and Ukhutu were renowned for tobacco, Uluguru had been the capi-
tal’s main source of vegetables since the railway reached it in German times ... [Dar es
Salaam] never dominated Tanganyika’s economy as Nairobi dominated Kenya’s.
Instead Tanganyika had a polycentric economy, with each export-producing region
acting as a focus of exchange.
This makes the Central Line somewhat unique in comparison to other colonial-era
railway projects: While much colonial infrastructure was built to transport goods
between key sites of production to ports, the Central Line supported multiple pro-
duction networks that were oriented towards different global and urban end mar-
kets. For example, while vegetables coming from Uluguru by rail were largely
consumed in Dar es Salaam, tobacco and cotton travelled along the same railway
line from western Tanzania to Dar es Salaam, where they were exported to inter-
national markets (Iliffe 1979).
During construction of the Central Line, labour migrants worked on the railway
but typically returned home during the rainy season to tend to their ﬁelds (Sun-
seri 1998). While some women participated in wage labour during construction,
most remained behind with children and engaged in subsistence agriculture (Sun-
seri 1998). As a result, the Central Line did not drive rapid urbanisation in inland
Tanzania (Iliffe 1979). Instead, measures were taken to “anchor peasants to their
home district, increase cash crop production, and expand the regional cattle
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economy by beating back the forests to control tsetse infestations” (Sunseri
1998:577). When construction on the line ﬁnished and the need for labour
declined, the colonial administration actively sought to curtail rural–urban migra-
tion (Sunseri 1998).
After World War I, the British acquired control over Tanzania and the approach
to ruling the territory changed (Coulson 2015). The British discouraged industriali-
sation in favour of focusing on growing agricultural production in Tanzania while
pushing ahead with industralisation in Kenya (Coulson 2013). In many ways, Tan-
zania became subservient to the needs of Kenya during this era (Yaffey 1970). As
industrial development stagnated, so to did new investment in transport infras-
tructure, which signiﬁcantly constrained the expansion of agricultural commodity
production (Rizzo 2006). When new investments in infrastructure were made dur-
ing this period, they were done with the intention of better integrating Tanzania
with the rest of the East Africa Protectorate (Maddox 1998).
Bridging Eras of Infrastructure-Led Development in Central
Tanzania
During the years immediately following Tanzania’s independence in 1961,
national development planning was heavily inﬂuenced by President Nyerere’s con-
cept of ujamaa, deﬁned by principles of socialism, self-reliance, and familyhood
(Malima 1979). In urban areas, an attempt was made to balance regional devel-
opment by deﬂecting growth away from Dar es Salaam towards other designated
“growth centers” through which industrial development could be channelled
(Roe 1970). Banks and large industries were nationalised and priority was given
to new transport infrastructure in the south. China provided an interest-free loan
to construct a new railway connecting Tanzania to Zambia and the United States
and World Bank ﬁnanced a tarmac road along the same route.
In rural areas, ujamaa was implemented through villagisation—compulsory living
in villages enforced by the state—and the establishment of agricultural cooperatives
(Coulson 2013). In determining village location, “the one and almost only factor
given consideration was the availability of infrastructure, and ... proximity to the
main road networks” (Shao 1986:234). Accordingly, villages were settled and
cooperatives were established along the Central Line during the late 1960s and
early 1970s. Given the fertility of the soil and rainfall levels along parts of this line,
many cooperatives did quite well for a period of time. For example, Boesen and
Mohele (1979) have written about the success of tobacco cooperatives in the Tab-
ora Region, who made use of both the Central Line and old German roads to trans-
port inputs and exports globally. In this sense, existing transport infrastructure
routes continued to facilitate the spatial integration of central Tanzania’s agricul-
tural areas into the global economy while disarticulating these same areas from the
rest of the country after independence (Slater 1977:11).
The export-oriented economy of Central Tanzania originated well before coloni-
sation, but was reinforced through German and British rule. As “modern” trans-
port infrastructure was built to move colonial commodities, porters and wagons
were replaced with locomotives and automobiles (Maddox 1998). Nevertheless,
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existing spatial patterns of infrastructure, production, and trade were solidiﬁed
through villagisation and cooperatisation during the independence era. Today, as
new infrastructure projects within the Central Corridor unfold, this territory is
being made once again accessible to global markets and functional for investors.
Infrastructure is being modernised and extended, but the spatial visions and terri-
torial plans for the Central Corridor reﬂect centuries-old aspirations for people,
commodities, and capital to ﬂow through this space with ease towards global
markets.
The “Colonial Moorings” of Infrastructure-Led
Development
Colonial administrations in East Africa prioritised infrastructure development to
make the extraction, production, and movement of commodities through their
territories more efﬁcient. This infrastructure supported the circulation of capital for
the dual purposes of empire- and proﬁt-making, enabling European powers to
exploit the full economic potential of their subjects and territories. Today, govern-
ments in East Africa—supported by emergent foreign powers, such as China—are
once again pursuing sweeping infrastructure programmes that serve similar pur-
poses. These new mega-infrastructure projects overlay their colonial antecedents
spatially. The spatial visions and territorial plans of present-day governments also
reﬂect colonial strategies for making territories accessible, useful, and visible within
global production and trade networks. In this sense, infrastructure development
in the colonial and post-independence eras alike is associated with the organisa-
tion of space to facilitate the extraversion of East African economies.
At the same time, today’s mega-infrastructure projects depart from the past in
certain ways. Perhaps the most visible differences are the new modes of infrastruc-
ture being constructed along pre-existing infrastructure routes, such as ﬁbre-optic
cables, and “more modern” forms of infrastructure replacing the old, such as
SGR. These infrastructure upgrades are meant to speed up circulation and dimin-
ish distance, cheapening the movement of commodities and accelerating produc-
tion (Danyluk 2017). Another difference is the so-called greening of global
infrastructure networks, such as the construction of renewable energy transmis-
sion lines within the LAPSSET Corridor. Massive coordinated investment in green
infrastructure are promised to enable capital and commodities to move speedily
with ease despite the uncertainties created by climate change. As Wiig and Silver
(2019) write, new global infrastructures have been positioned as the answer to
the risk and disruption created by a turbulent global economy and an uncertain
future.
Yet, Cresswell (2010:29) cautions that there is a temptation to think of a more
“mobile world as something that replaces a world of ﬁxities” and urges those
studying infrastructure to “consider the politics of obduracy, ﬁxity, and friction”
amidst claims of seamless connectivity. In this section, we show how focusing on
the longue duree of East Africa’s infrastructure development is useful for uncover-
ing “permanences in place” along infrastructure routes. In other words, historicis-
ing infrastructure projects offers useful insights into how pre-colonial, colonial,
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and post-independence transport routes have always made possible some ﬂows
of information, materials, and people while slowing or halting ﬂows for others
(Enns 2018). We are particularly interested in how points of immobility or moor-
ing “tether” new mega-infrastructure corridors to the past.
In northern Kenya, the securitisation of human lives along key transport routes
across time has resulted in ﬁxity for pastoralists. In some ways, today’s efforts to
secure circulation along LAPSSET reﬂect strategies used to manage the region
when the NFD was administered as a “closed” district under the colonial adminis-
tration and in the years following the Shifta War under the newly independent
administration. As in the past, incidences of banditry and conﬂict continue to be
met by security operations that attempt to ﬁx people in place. Checkpoints are
set-up along key routes to restrict the movement of residents. When insecurity is
high, even children, youth, and teachers may be stopped from traveling through
checkpoints to school. At the same time, certain types of people and goods con-
tinue to ﬂow through the corridor with ease: Police wave through lorries carrying
miraa for export, coaches coming from Ethiopia, 4x4s carrying tourists, and mili-
tary vehicles carrying armed forces. This illustrates how perceived threats to the
smooth, efﬁcient circulation of desirable people, commodities, and capital are ren-
dered immobile.
The securitisation of non-human life along key transport routes in northern
Kenya is another enduring trend. In the past, fear of cattle disease resulted in
repeated quarantines in the NFD and prevented the expansion of the northern
livestock sector. These fears continue to limit the mobility of pastoralists and their
livestock today. Even as LAPSSET is promised to increase livestock production
across northern Kenya, livestock are regularly placed under quarantine. For exam-
ple, following a recent outbreak of Rift Valley Fever in 2018, a ban was placed on
the slaughter, sale, and movement of livestock in and out of the region for nearly
two months. Both historically and in the present, new transport infrastructure has
served to secure movement through the region for some by enabling authorities
to control the movement of others—in this case, pastoralists and their livestock.
Points of immobility and mooring along key infrastructure routes in central Tan-
zania also exist. Along the Central Corridor, smallholder farmers often remain
stuck in place because of how they have come to be positioned within value
chains over time rather than because of physical barriers. Tanzania’s colonial
administrations dictated where and when labour moved along key transport
routes to ensure a large enough workforce to support colonial plantations and
outgrower schemes (Sunseri 1998). Following a period of relative empowerment
for smallholder farmers during the independence era, the country is experiencing
a resurgence of agricultural schemes that mimic agricultural systems in the past.
In line with the government’s goal of transforming its “low productivity agricul-
tural economy to a semi-industrialized one” (RoT 2011), contract farming and
outgrower schemes are being widely promoted. These schemes risk ﬁxing small-
holders at the bottom of value chains.
For example, along the Central Corridor, many smallholders grow sunﬂower
seeds for purchase by private enterprises that transform the seeds into edible oil.
While some smallholders along completed segments of a new road between
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Dodoma and Tabora noticed more buyers coming through their villages more fre-
quently than before, they remain dependent on these buyers for links to proces-
sors and markets. Moreover, transport costs along the new road remain high,
meaning smallholders often have to wait for buyers to come to them. This reveals
how transport infrastructure in central Tanzania enables some actors and goods
to ﬂow through space with greater ease than others.
Settlement patterns offer another example of how immobility or mooring along
both mega-infrastructure corridors reﬂects continuity with the past. In Kenya, a
goal of Vision 2030 and intended by-product of LAPSSET is urbanisation along the
corridor route. Six urban centres along LAPSSET have been identiﬁed as growth
poles (GoK 2015). The government plans to invest infrastructural developments
in these towns to drive their growth and attract investment. These centres are
also meant to absorb populations from rural areas once opportunities for formal
employment are created (GoK 2015:112). At the same time, pastoralists are being
advised to prepare for an expanded livestock market by minimising their herds
and adopting “modern ways of farming” (Rwamba 2019). Such prescriptions
align with previous administrations’ attempts to modernise and sedentarise pas-
toralists in northern Kenya (see Fratkin and Roth 2005). Thus, the emphasis
placed on urbanisation and formal employment today represents the continuation
of earlier efforts to ﬁx pastoralists in space and to make their livelihoods more
amenable to the global economy.
Comparatively, the Tanzanian government is placing less emphasis on promot-
ing urbanisation in Vision 2025 and its ﬂagship projects, like the Central Corridor.
Instead, the government hopes to maintain sufﬁcient labour along new corridor
routes to ensure agro-industrial growth in rural areas. As Tanzania’s Second Five
Year Development Plan explains, disparities between urban and rural areas will be
addressed through rural industrialisation, as smallholder farmers are linked to
large-scale enterprises and availed opportunities to supply inputs and labour to
industry (RoT 2016). The plan also states that steps will be taken to prevent rural–
urban migration (RoT 2016). The goal of maintaining and mainstreaming rural
economies through projects like the Central Corridor reﬂects continuity with ear-
lier administrations’ ideas about rural development.
Ultimately, how people experience transport infrastructure—both historically
and in the present—depends on who individuals are and how they are situated in
relation to the wider political economy and spatial vision for a region. Transport
infrastructure is not intended to enable all ﬂows of capital, commodities, and peo-
ple through space with the same ﬂuidity. Rather, it is primarily designed to meet
the needs of global capital. Furthermore, patterns of mobility and immobility set
in motion during the colonial scramble for Africa continue to “create impassable
chokepoints” that “make circulation improbable or even impossible” for many
today (Cowen 2014:94, 115). This is true despite claims that East Africa is inevita-
bly moving towards seamless, inclusive connectivity. By shifting our gaze to ﬁxity
rather than simply ﬂow, we make visible additional ways that new infrastructure
projects carry the colonial past into the present, sustaining colonial and racial cap-
italist systems in the process while stiﬂing other ways of being and moving
through space.
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Differentiated Political Reactions to Infrastructure-Led
Development
The analysis presented above about the coloniality of East Africa’s new transport
infrastructure raises questions about what the region’s latest infrastructure scram-
ble means for peasants and indigenous peoples. In this ﬁnal section, we consider
how those subjected to new mega-infrastructure projects are reacting and mobil-
ising in response. Speciﬁcally, we draw attention to differences in reactions to
LAPSSET and the Central Corridor, arguing that varied political reactions to mega-
infrastructure projects in these two contexts can be attributed in part to different
collective memories of empire-building during the colonial era and state-building
after independence.
As with any mega-infrastructure project, reactions to LAPSSET are diverse. LAPS-
SET is meant to enable ﬂows of commodities, goods, and people moving in the
“right” direction using “modern” modes of transportation, like SGR. It therefore
presents certain people with the possibility that their livelihoods could be
improved through enhanced connectivity to global markets. Yet, many of the
transhumance pastoralists who live along the corridor express anxiety about the
adverse impacts that LAPSSET is having on their ways of life. The everyday mobili-
ties that sustain them and their livestock are being disrupted by new transport
infrastructure. As one elder from a pastoralist community along the new LAPSSET
highway explained: “There is a high and fast ﬂow of vehicles on the road now ...
The road is killing everything. Nothing is spared: not wildlife, children, livestock
or the elderly” (Interview, Isiolo-Moyale Highway, March 2018).
With the development of LAPSSET, ways of organising and moving through
space that sustain pastoralists and their livestock are being interrupted, restricted,
and more closely regulated. In response, acts of resistance by pastoralists and
other indigenous groups are increasingly common, including road blockades, pro-
test marches, labour strikes, and lawsuits. Through these acts of resistance, indige-
nous peoples are demanding that their mobilities, economies, socialities—and the
ecologies in which they are embedded—be protected and that fair compensation
be provided for disruptions or losses. Their movements are supported by national
and transnational alliances of civil society organisations; their struggles are receiv-
ing media attention; and, in some cases, their court victories are inﬂuencing
development plans. For example, in 2018 the High Court of Kenya ordered the
government to pay 1.76 billion Kenyan shillings (roughly 17.4 million US dollars)
in compensation to ﬁshing communities affected by construction on the Lamu
Port and to devise a management plan in consultation with the community to
protect and preserve their land as the development of LAPSSET progresses.
Thus far, peasant communities along the Central Corridor have not reacted in
the same ways or to the same extent. Many smallholder farmers along the corri-
dor are equally concerned about how the expansion of transport infrastructure
and the growth of agro-industries will impact their access to land and natural
resources. Land acquisition processes have largely unfolded without their consul-
tation and with little or no compensation for losses; wage labour opportunities
during the construction of new transport infrastructure involved poor conditions
and low pay; and new infrastructure is associated with environmental degradation
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and deforestation. Yet, these events have met with very little organised, overt
resistance. Rather, many smallholders are “holding out”, believing their livelihood
ambitions align with long-term development plans for the Central Corridor. They
hope that one day they will be able to supplement their existing agricultural activ-
ities with new wage labour opportunities in the agro-industrial sector or grow
their own agricultural ventures using more efﬁcient modes of transportation. Dur-
ing conversations with farmers along this route, some spoke with anticipation
about a future in which they envisioned themselves loading produce into train
cars to prevent it from spoiling on long journeys to Dar es Salaam or other distant
urban centres.
We suggest that different reactions to LAPSSET and the Central Corridor are
shaped in part by the legacies of previous iterations of national development and
spatial planning. In Tanzania, smallholder farmers appear willing to believe that
there will continue to be space for their livelihoods and ways of life in the future,
as peasant labour has always been central to the government’s development
plans—as illustrated by the Arusha Declaration (Huizer 1973) and more recently
Kilimo Kwanza (“Agriculture First”) (Mbunda 2016). Although peasant labour has
often been exploited and controlled with a heavy-hand in Tanzania, it has long
been recognised as a cornerstone of national development (see Huizer 1973).
During conversations with smallholders along the Central Corridor, it was also
suggested that meanings attached to collective memories of ujamaa encourage
smallholders to comply with projects being implemented to serve public interests.
In contrast, the violent exclusion enforced in Kenya’s NFD during the colonial
era was followed by further exclusion through the dehumanising experience of
forced villagisation after independence. Collective memories of these historical
processes continue to shape how pastoralists in northern Kenya understand their
identity and position in relation to the modern state today. Many see the state as
a powerful and even foreign entity that exists to control and punish rather than
to sustain and include. Although new transport infrastructure has improved con-
nectivity across the north of Kenya in ways that could beneﬁt pastoralists, there
lingers a readiness to challenge or resist those aspects of infrastructure develop-
ment that threaten people’s everyday mobilities, economies, and socialities. In this
regard, political reactions to new mega-infrastructure projects are themselves
“moored” to the past as collective memories continue to shape people’s identities
and their senses of loyalty or disloyalty to the modern state and its spatial visions
for the future.
Conclusion
East Africa is experiencing record levels of investment in mega-infrastructure
development, which is promised to catalyse further investment along transport
routes and contribute to widespread socio-economic development in “discon-
nected” and “unproductive” areas. Despite promises that infrastructure develop-
ment will deliver more modern, prosperous futures for all, new mega-
infrastructure projects share remarkable similarities with those of the colonial era.
In this article, we show how the spatial visions and territorial plans of colonial
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administrators are reappearing in those associated with new mega-infrastructure
corridors today, focusing on LAPSSET in Kenya and the Central Corridor in Tanza-
nia. Tracing these two new mega-infrastructure corridors across space and time
unearths historical antecedents that continue to shape their aspirations and
designs, revealing the coloniality of East Africa’s latest infrastructure agenda. In
this regard, our analysis contributes to a nascent debate in literature on the “in-
frastructure turn” by demonstrating that the current resurgence of state-led terri-
torial design in East Africa owes just as much to spatial visions and territorial
logics of early colonial administrators as it does to national development and spa-
tial planning initiatives in the independence era.
Furthermore, this article emphasises the importance of considering the longue
duree of infrastructure-led development. Engaging with long-term history reveals
that new mega-infrastructure projects carry with them ambitions from the colo-
nial past and therefore materialise in ways that continue to serve the interests of
global capital over those of peasants and indigenous peoples. As Braudel
(2009:178) writes, certain structures “encumber history and restrict it, and hence
control its ﬂow. Other structures crumble more quickly. But all structures are
simultaneously pillars and obstacles. As obstacles they provide limitations ... from
which man [sic] and his [sic] experiences cannot liberate themselves”. Along these
lines, our ﬁnal discussion of “colonial moorings” highlights how new infrastruc-
ture—along with the logics, meanings, and politics that inevitably get built-in to
infrastructure—functions like other structures in society to encumber history and
restrict change.
To conclude, our discussion in this article points to the need for more attention
to the coloniality of new mega-infrastructure projects in East Africa, as well as
other parts of the world. In particular, we see a need to better historicise the role
of so-called emerging powers in East Africa’s contemporary infrastructure scram-
ble. It is well known that China is funding and building extraordinary amounts of
infrastructure across Africa: Understanding whether Chinese-ﬁnanced infrastruc-
ture projects are fundamentally changing spatial visioning for the region or
instead bringing to fruition ambitions of the colonial past is worthy of investiga-
tion, as is questioning whether Chinese investment in Africa’s infrastructure aligns
or departs from previous eras of south–south solidarity. The role of other emerg-
ing powers in driving infrastructure-led development across the continent also
deserves more attention—including often-overlooked actors like South Africa or
Turkey. However people might choose to advance this research agenda, our anal-
ysis reveals that focus on the longue duree is vital to understanding the emanci-
patory potential and limits of infrastructure-led development.
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Endnote
1
“Coloniality” refers to “longstanding patterns of power that ... continue to deﬁne cul-
ture, labour, intersubjective relations and knowledge production, long after the end of
direct colonialism” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013:16). The concept articulates “continuities of
colonial mentalities, psychologies and worldviews” into the “postcolonial neocolonised”
world where coloniality shapes people’s everyday lives (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013:8, 7) (see
also Mamdani 1996; Mbembe 2001; Ng~ug~ı wa Thiong’o 1986).
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